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The increased levelof economic interaction in the Pacific Rim region
hasbrought with ita correspondingincrease inthe numberof potentialtrade
disputes. Disputesemerge in a varietyof often conflictingcultural contexts.
This paper describes a conceptual and methodological framework for
examining cultural aspects of trade disputes, and presents several case
studies involving the People's Republic of China (PRC).
While a comprehensive empirical review of trade disputes involving
Chinaiswell beyondthe rangeofthis study,it ishopedthat the casestudies
discussedin thispaper canbe usefulin achieving greater understanding of
the role culture plays in trade disputes -- essentially using a narrative
approach to call attention to particular points of interest.1The selection of
case studiesis intendedto highlight not only the differing contexts in which
disputesarise,are conducted, andget resolved, but alsothe differing types
of parties and trade relations, and finally the interplay of culture and trade
disputes in the Chinese context. Bearing in mind the problems of overly-
detailedspecificity and overly-broad generality, it is hoped that these case
studies will provide useful examples that may illuminate the interplay
between culture and trade disputeresolution.
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TRADE DISPUTESAND CULTURAL CONTEXTS:
GENERAL OVERVIEW
At the outset, it is important to clarify what is meant by the term "trade
disputes." By "trade," the study mean_sexchanges of goods, services,
technology, financial resources, and other items worthy of exchange, By
"disputes," the study.refersto conflictswith sufficient levels of significance
to motivate either or both parties to consider the use of institutionalized
resolution mechanisms,2 This study will focus on three categories:
(i) government-to-government disputes; (ii) private-to-government dis-
putes; and (iii) private-to-privatedisputes.This study recognizesthat these
categoriesareimperfect--in particular,they tendtooverlook thedistinctive
nature ofgovernment-sponsored forms suchas state-owned enterprises in
nonmarket economiesand Crown Corporations.3 Nonetheless,institutions
currently in place to resolve disputes generally tend to be organized
according to category classifications. Thus, government-to-government
disputes are often handled in the context of General Agreement onTariffs
and Trade/WorldTradeOrganization (GAI-F/WTO)panels,private-govern-
ment disputes are often subject to resolution by The InternationalCentre
for the Settlement of Jnvestment Disputes (ICSID), and private-to-private
disputes are often resolved through a variety of commercial arbitration
tribunals.4
In examining trade disputes, a number of operational issues arise.
These may beclassified as concerning:(i) emergence; (ii)conduct; and (iii)
resolution.Analysis ofthe emergenceoftrade disputesentailsa discussion
of attendant circumstances, causation, issues in dispute, nature of the
parties, and other questions on how the matter arose. The conduct of the
dispute entails such matters as processes of negotiation, positions taken
by the parties at various stages, institutions involved, and other matters
attendant to the dispute afterit hasarisen.Resolutionof the dispute entails
questions such as institutions and processes for bringing a dispute to a
close. Inaddressing trade disputes as the object of cultural contextualiza-POTTER: TRADE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA 151
tion, the study will examine these three stages of disputes, as well as the
varying types of parties and trade relations.5
Toa large extent,the cultural contextof trade disputes involves broad
cultural norms as well as specific attributesof legalculture in the societies
where one or both of the parties, and perhaps the dispute resolution
institutions,are located.6In examiningthe question ofculture, it is usefulto
bearinmind its differinglevels,the dynamicsbywhich cultureismanifested,
and the ways in which cultureis manipulated. Levels ofculture correspond
to different levels of society, such as the elite (political, social and eco-
nomic), professional and middle classes, working classes, and so-called
"underclasses" and structurally impoverished groups. Manifestations of
culture can take on many forms, including direct expression, perception
(including the interpretation of circumstances attending the emergence,
conduct, and resolution of disputes) and other aspects of behavior,which,
in turn, may be affected by differing degrees of formality and informality in
social relations. The manipulation of culture often involves the role of
appearances in presenting to outside partiescultural forms and normsthat
are not held personally but may have some explanatory value. Although
many, if not most, parties to trade disputes are representatives of elite
culture, they maywell adoptnoneliteculturalperspectivesduringthe course
of emergence, conduct and resolution of disputes. In sum, examination of
cultural contexts should take intoaccountdiffering levelsof cultureand the
contradictions therein,the varying ways in which culture ismanifested, and
the potential for manipulation of culture.
CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF RESOLVING
FOREIGN COMMERCIAL DISPUTE IN CHINA
Foreign-related commercial disputesin China have increaseddramati-
cally of late. The reasons are many and varied, including such factors as
the general increase in China's foreign business relationsand the develop-
ing institutional infrastructure for dispute resolution in China. While a
complete review of China's institutions for resolving foreign business dis-152 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
putes iswell beyondthe scope of this paper,the institutionallandscape can
besummarized.SinceChinaisnotyeta partytoGA-I-F/WTO, the provisions
originally set forth in GATT and WTO's "Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes''7 do not apply to gov-
ernment-to-government disputes involving China, which are still resolved
primarily through negotiation, although Beijing has indicated its intent to
respect the Understanding pending the PRC's formal accession. China is
a partytothe Convention onthe Settlement of Disputes Between Stateand
the Nationals of OtherStates (ICSID Treaty),8and, thus, ICSID arbitration
is available in private-to-government disputes involving the PRC govern-
ment. These types of disputes .are also handled through state-to-state
negotiations in many instances.
Private-to-private disputes involving China are generally subject to
resolution by either the Intermediate Level People's Courts whose foreign
economic tribunals have jurisdiction over foreign-related disputes, or the
Chinese International Economic and TradeArbitration Commission (CIE-
TAC) organized under the Chinese Commission for Promotion of Interna-
tional Trade (CCPIT, sometimes referred to as the China International
Chamber of Commerce).9 While most disagreements between business
partiesare resolved through negotiation, unresolved disagreementswhich
mature intofull-fledged disputes generally end up before one of these two
institutions. The institutional infrastructure itself reveals cultural elements
which serve as the context for the disputes which these organizations
examine.
Cultural factorscan be seen to play a role injudicial dispute resolution
in China before the Chinese courts.1°The low level of political status and
authority of formal legal institutions derived from traditional Chinese atti-
tudes as well as from Maoist ideology impedes the capacity of courts to
compel the. production of evidence and to enforce awards. The often
parochial view taken by courts toward enforcement of arbitral awards and
even judicial awards by courts outside the immediate area of jurisdiction
reflects ingrained traditions of Iocalism and the centrality of personal
relations as the basis for behavior. Judicial processes of internal andPOTTER:TRADE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA 153
informal fact-finding, as well as of decisionmaking, are driven to a large
degree by traditional cultural norms.
While the "Foreign Economic LitigationChambers" (shewaijingji shen-
pan ting) of the Chinese People's Courts are available to hear disputes
involving foreign parties,foreign disputants have largelyavoidedparticipat-
ing in court litigation if possible. The Chinese courts are seen as heavily
politicized. This perception is influenced significantly by the continued role
of the Communist Party-dominated adjudication committees, despite an
official directive ordering a diminution in their activities.11The exclusion of
foreign lawyers from direct participation in court proceedings and their lack
ofcapacity evento securemembershipinthe Chinese barassociationhave
beenseen to confirm doubtsaboutthe likelihoodof receivingafair hearing.
Thus,the politicization,low levelof professionalism,and local protectionism
of the Chinese courts have largely made them inadequate to address
effectively the dispute resolutionconcerns of foreign businesses.12This is
why mostforeign businessesavoid themwhere possible. However,foreign
businesseshave littlechoice in the matterofenforcement of arbitralawards
where the Chinese courts play a pivotal role.
The Chinese arbitration system iscontinually Changingin responseto
institutional pressures as well as to new ideas about dispute resolution.13
Thus, CIETAC's success with international commercial arbitration has
emboldened the State Administration for Industry and Commerce to
strengthen its long-standingbut relatively inactive mechanisms for resolu-
tion of domestic disputes -- including disputes between Chinese compa-
nies and foreign investment enterprises registered in China. International
norms of private law are increasingly being adopted by Chinese commen-
tators as necessary components of China's transition to a market econ-
omy.14Thus, notions about free will and contract theory as the basis for
commercialarbitrationsuggesta respectfor individual autonomythat would
have been unheard of in China even during the 1980s.15
The cultural context through which Chinese institutions operate and
foreign norms are perceivedremains important.Culturalpreceptsaboutthe
centrality and uniqueness of China and historically derived imperatives154 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
about separating Chinese and foreign matters are evident in discussions
aboutwhether CIETACjurisdiction and internationalcommercial arbitration
in general should be limited to "foreign-related" matters.16Bureaucratic
politics have also played a role, as Chinese courts have long insisted that
arbitral decisions which are not "foreign-related" may fall outside the
jurisdiction of CIETAC and in any event are subject to full judicial review
(including review of facts and the application of law) prior to enforcement.
Some commentators have urged that judicial involvement be warranted
throughout the process of international commercial arbitration in many
cases, even to the extent of adopting a rather liberal reading of the limited
conditions for refusing enforcement set out in the New YorkConvention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (to which China
acceded effective 1987).17Court officials have suggested that the nation-
ality of the parties isdeterminativeof whether or not a matteris"foreign-re-
lated" -- such that a Chinese arbitration involving foreign investment
enterprises registered in China or involving international contracts by
Chinese-registered parties would be subject to full judicial scrutiny rather
than the limited recognition and enforcement procedures required by the
New YorkConvention and reiterated in China's Civil Procedure Law.
Culture has also played a role in efforts to formalize rules for arbitra-
tors.18CIETAChas enacted formal rules requiring fairnessand impartiality
by arbitrators. This has come in the face of repeated problems where
arbitrators have, either during the course of the mediation process that
previouslywas intertwinedwith arbitrationor during the courseof preparing
the matter for hearing, engaged in what are essentially ex parte contacts
with thedisputants.19While suchco,_tactmayseem oddtoforeign litigators,
it is generally consistent with Chinese traditional norms regarding the
judge￿arbitrator, who is expected to meet regularly with disputants and to
personally investigate facts.2° Since the disputants are seen to be in a
subordinate positionto the judge/arbitrator,not merely in the context of the
dispute at hand but socially and morally as well, personal contacts are not
expected to affect the ultimatejudgment. Nonetheless,CIETAC'sefforts to
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notions of the relations between disputants andjudge/arbitrators are often
not realized, and that legal regulation rather than moral norms should be
the basisfor governing decisionmakers.
The cultural contexts for the institutional infrastructure in which com-
mercial dispute resolution in the PRC operates serve as an important
backdropfor the case studies described below.These will bediscussed by
referring to the identifiedstages of government-to-government, private-to-
government and private-to-private disputes.
Government-to-Government Disputes:
IntellectualPropertyDisputesBetweenChinaand the UnitedStates.21
Trade disputes between China and the United States (U.S.) are par-
ticularly useful in illuminating the cultural dynamics of government-to-gov-
ernment disputes,which alsorevealthe extenttowhich noninstitutionalized
mechanisms are used. The various Memorandaof Understanding (MOU)
between Chinaand the U.S. dated 1989,1992,and 1995imposed specific
obligations on China to improve its Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
regime, in return for which the U.S. agreed not to impose costly tariffs on
Chinese imports. The MOUs reflect U.S. and Chinese efforts to resolve
trade differences through bilateral negotiation without the intervention of
multilateral dispute resolution organizations. However,the perspectives of
the two governments are quite different. The U.S., on the one hand, has
chosento incorporatetrade sanctioningmechanismsintoits trade laws and
then use these as a basis for extracting concessions from foreign trade
partners.22The Chinese, on the other hand, often view negotiated agree-
mentsaspartofa long-termprocessofrelationship-building,entailingbroad
agreements to general principles and ideals rather than specific commit-
ments about behavior.
U.S. - China MOU no. 1 (1989)
Underthe 1979TradeAgreementwith the United States,Chinaagreed
that patent,trademark and copyright protection for U.S.firms and individu-
als should be commensuratewith U.S. protection inthese areasoffered to1.56 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Chinese parties. Ten years later, the U.S. government and many U.S.
companies believedthatChina's IPR system remained inadequate. China
was one of nine nations and regions (including Taiwan) placed on the
"priority watch list" in 1989when the Special Section 301 provisionsof the
U.S.TradeAct becameeffective.Toavoid the impositionoftrade sanctions,
China agreed with the U.S. in May 1989 to an.MOU that contained broad
languageabout improving IPR protection.
In the agreement, China statedthat it wasactively studying the possi-
bility of joining various international IPR conventions, but agreed to a
number of specific steps as well. The 1989 MOU committed China to
introducecopyright legislation by the end of the year,which would include
computer software as a category under protectedwork. China also agreed
to revise its patent law by the end of 1989to extend the duration of patent
protection and expand its scope in accord with international practice.
Although not stated explicitly, the intent of this provision was inter alia to
lengthenthe existing period ofprotection of 15yearsfor inventionsandfive
yearsfor utility modelsand industrialdesigns,and to permit Chinesepatent
protection for chemical formulas. In return, the US. agreed to drop China
from the priority watch list.
•U.S. -China MOU no. 2 (1992)
Although the 1989 MOU was significant in terms of identifying prob-
lems, it was flawed by an absence of detail. While China believed that it
had satisfied the requirements of the Agreement -- and indeed China did
enact a Copyright (Authorship Rights) Law effective 1991 -- the US.
believedthat China hadfailed to complyin other respects. Particularissues
includedcopyright protectionfor software, patent protectionto pharmaceu-
ticals and other chemicals and. better enforcement. As a result of these
concerns, the U.S. placed China on the "priority foreign country" list yet
again in 1991.
In January 1992,China and the U.S. signed a second MOU,whereby
Chinaagreedto a number of revisionsto its IPR regime. Inthe patent area,
China agreed to extend the duration of patent protection to :20years, and
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to afford patent protection to chemical substances (including pharmaceuti-
cals and agricultural chemicals). China also agreed to limit its compulsory
licensing provisions. Inthe copyright area, China agreed tojoin the Berne
Copyright Convention and the Geneva Phonogram Convention, to amend
its newly enacted Copyright Law,and to issue new regulations in order to
implement these two conventions. China agreed to extend copyright pro-
tection to existing literary works and sound recordings as well as to new
works, and agreedthatcomputer softwarewouldbeprotectedas acategory
under literary work for a period of 50 years. Finally, China agreed to
introduce legislation for the protection of trade secrets.
U.S. - China MOU no. 3 (1995)
While the 1989and 1993MOUs were aimed primarily at encouraging
Chinatostep upits lawmakingefforts,the thirdMOUsigned in1995focused
primarily on enforcement. By mid-1994 the United States Trade Repre-
sentative (USTR) haddeterminedthat Chinawas notenforcingthe intellec-
tual property laws it had enacted, particularli/with respect to copyrightable
material such as computer software and compact discs (CDs). China was
again placedonthe Special301"priority watchlist," and inaneffort toavoid
trade sanctions agreed toyet another MOU incorporating an "Action Plan"
on the protection of intellectual property rights.
The Action Plancontemplateda 3-5year sustained enforcement effort
by the Chinese State Council's IPR Working Conference (bangong huiyi)
to improve the enforcement ofintellectualproperty rights,and tostrengthen
the dissemination ofinformationand training.TheWorking Conference was
established to replacewhat formally had beena leadingsmall group (LSG)
in charge of intellectual property.Based at the State Science and Technol-
ogyCommission (SSTC),the Working Conference isan interagency liaison
groupwith counterpartsatthe ProvincialScience and TechnologyCommit-
tees. The interagency mission of the Working Conference was to be
augmented bythe work of Enforcement TaskForces established within the
major intellectual property institutions such as the China Patent Office, the
Trademark Bureau and the National Copyright Administration of China.158 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
The Working Conference and the Enforcement Task Forces are in-
tended to work over the long-term (3-5 years) duration of the action plan,
while an intensiveenforcement programiscontemplatedduring the firstsix
monthsofthe plan.TheAction Planalsoprovidesfor particularenforcement
efforts in specific fields, such as audiovisual products and computer soft-
ware. Inaddition to the standard language prohibiting infringementswhich
is reminiscent of other elements in China's intellectual property regime,
increased inspections and inventory supervision are contemplated in an
effort to identify infringing products. Destruction of infringing products is
authorized, and repeatviolators may havetheir business licensesrevoked.
While the establishment ofthe Working Conference reflectedan effort
to build interagency coordination, it has little powerto compel cooperation
among the variousadministrative systems (xitong) responsiblefor intellec-
tual property.The EnforcementTask Forces,onthe other handhave broad
enforcement authority to punish violators, but tend to favor the parochial
interests of their respective xitong over the needfor cohesive and coordi-
nated enforcement of intellectual property rights.
Dimensions of culture at various stages of the dispute .
TheU.S.-Chinadisputesover intellectualpropertyreflecta combination
of commercial interest and cultural difference. Chinese negotiators have
repeatedly argued that problems with intellectual property enforcement in
China stem from traditional culturalvalues. This view hasbeen recognized
by foreign scholarsas well .23 In contrast to Chinese emphasis on cultural
atttibutes, U.S. negotiators have tended to emphasize the commercial
interests of local enterprises and government officials as the reasons for
IPR violations.
While both positions have some degree ofjustification, it is important
to note the ways in which the cultural orientation of each side affects its
respective position.Thus, whetherfrom a Marxist perspectivethat focuses
on culture as a superstructure driven by material conditionsof relations of
production to one that focuses on Chinese traditional norms, culture in
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inthe assessment of materialconditions. Bycontrast,the UnitedStates has
long embodied the perspective that culture is not a significant determinant
of economicactivity. Thus, in the courseof the U.S.-China IPR disputes, it
is not surprising to seerepeated clashes and distrustbetween negotiators:
The Chinese, on the one hand, are offended at the USTR's dismissal of
Chinese culture, while the Americans, onthe other hand, dismiss Chinese
cultural explanations as mere obfuscation.
The U.S.-China agreements on intellectual property rights reflect cul-
tural tensions in other ways as well. Chinese negotiators view the MOUs
as imposed rather than truly mutualm indeed, Chinaagreed to them only
when faced with the imminent imposition of punitive trade sanctions.
Moreover, the norms of legal institutionalism contained in the MOUs run
countertomany Chinese normativeperpectives. Incontrastto U.S.models,
regulation and the exercise of authority in China are not the product of
enactment of formal rules in institutions, but ratherresult from a processof
consensus-building and personal relations between interested stakehold-
ers.And, even asChinabegrudginglyaccepted U.S.demandsfor improved
intellectual property protection,the Chinese cultural contextm particulady
the role of bureaucratic politics _ continued to dominate the implementa-
tion of the negotiated agreement.
Private-to-Government Disputes:
From Beijing Jeep to Revpower
The BeijingJeep case iswell known asone ofthefirst major investment
projectdisputesbetween aforeign privatefirm andthe Chinesegovernment
while the Revpower case involves perhapsthe most recent major dispute
between a foreign investorand the Chinese government. These two dis-
putes each reflect the role played by cultural factors at different points in
time during the reform period _ the beginning of the "open door" policy
and prior to China's accession to the GA-I-F-WTO.160 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Beijing Jeep24
Thewell-known dispute between American MotorsCorporation (AMC)
and the Chinese government over the AMC Beijing Jeep joint venture
highlights the number of ways in which cultural differences can affect
disputesbetweenprivatecompaniesandgovernments.Culturaldifferences
arose almost from the outset of the project and affected management,
production, personnel, and otheroperational issues.The crisis that almost
brought down the joint venture concerned the conversion of the Chinese
currency proceedsfrom domesticsales into foreign currency that could be
repatriated. The willingness of the Chinesejoint venture party and related
government entitiesto assist inthis processwas undermined bydisappoint-
ment over AMC's plans to import completely knock-down (CKD) kits for
Jeep Cherokeesto beassembled in China. The Chinese sid3 had thought
that the joint venture would entail design and production of a completely
new Chinese jeep.
The Chinese viewed the joint venture contract not as the formal
limitation on the legal relationship with AMC, but merely as an expression
ofa broadercommitmentto mutualassistance.While the contractlanguage
appeared to permit AMC to limit its technology transfer to CKD kits, the
Chinese side concluded that AMC's CKD plan violated a basic moral
commitment toassist the Chinese in developing a new Jeep -- regardless
of the specific language of the joint venture agreement. The problem
became a crisis when the joint venture was unable to convert sufficient
Chinese local currency (nonconvertible renminbi) to fund the purchase of
the CKD kits. AMC, for its part, believed that its obligation ran counter to
the letterofthe agreement.AMC believedthat the Chinesewere fully aware
of, and had accepted the limits, to the.promised technology,and also that
they had an obligation to fund the imports of CKD kits.
Thus, the emergence of the dispute lay in large part in differing
conceptions about the nature of technology and the extent of mutual
commitment between the joint venture parties. For the Chinese, the rela-
tionship and the moral commitments ofempathy (ganqing)that this embod-
ied were first and foremost of importance, and the written contract wasPOTTER: TRADE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA 161
merely a formal but not adefinitive expression.The foreign investor,onthe
other hand, while recognizing tne need to build a relationship with the
Chinese and to make accommodations necessary to ensure the success
of the project, nonetheless viewed the written contract as the essence of
the agreement. The dispute over the repatriationof profitsand the distrust
that accompanied it stemmed, toa largeextent, from the very fundamental
differences over the nature of the personal and contractual obligations
between the joint venture parties.
The parties' culturally grounded perspectives on the nature of their
contractual relationshipsaffectedthe contract and resolutionofthe dispute.
Thus, AMC continually relied on a legalistic interpretation of its contractual
obligations onthe transferoftechnology andits rightstorepatriateits profits.
The Chinese, on the other hand,were of the view that repatriationof profits
required government intervention on the currency conversion issue, and
they were reluctant to seek this in the face of the perceived failure of the
foreign partner to live up to its obligations on the technology transfer
component of the project. So, while AMC continually lobbied U.S. and
Chinese government officials to imposea solution basedon a formal legal
interpretation of fixed rights and duties, the Chinese side continually em-
phasizedthe needtonegotiateasolutionthatwould reaffirmthe relationship
between the parties.
Ultimately a solution was achievedthat embodied someelements from
both positions.The solution was brokered through the intervention of high
level Chinese officials including Vice Premier Zhu Rongji and former U.S.
Ambassador to China Leonard Woodcock. In this sense, the process of
resolving the dispute was extra-legal in character, and seemed to yield to
Chinese preferences for informal dispute resolution through the interces-
sion of community leaders. Likewise, AMC agreed to deliver additional
technology in the form of training and equipment,thus appearing to accept
the notion that its obligation to the Chinese side involved a firmer commit-
ment to assistance than had been articulated in the formal agreement. On
the other side, the Chinese formally agreed to assist with currency conver-
sion and repatriation of profits.162 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Despitethe appearance of a mutually acceptable negotiated solution,
the Beijing Jeep dispute did not really reconcile the cultural differences
between the concerned parties. Officials in the BeijingAutomotive Works,
doubtful from the outset about AMC's commitment to their welfare, had
these views confirmed during the course of the dispute. Despite the
negotiated solution, the Chinese side remained circumspect about its
relations with AMC. Still expecting that the businessarrangements would
involve personal and moral commitments of mutualassistance to an equal
or greater degree thanformal legalcommitments,the Chineseside's basic
approach to commercial relations was unchanged by the dispute. On the
foreign side, AMC officials in charge of the project came out of the dispute
convinced that the Chinese sidecould not betrusted to honoragreements.
Thus, the foreign investor stuck by his basic precept that the agreement
was clearly spelled out in the written contract and that additional personal
ties were secondary if at all relevant, Thus, the Beijing Jeep dispute
revealedthe extentto which cultural differences canaffect the emergence,
conduct and resolution of commercial disputes in China. Indeed, these
differences remained in evidenceeven afterthe dispute was resolved.
Revpower25
The Revpowercase involved several different elements ranging from
a private-to-privatedispute with a Chinese licensee to a private-to-govern-
ment dispute over enforcement of an international arbitral award.
Revpower,aHong KongsubsidiaryofRoss EngineeringCorporation inFort
Lauderdale, Florida,entered into a technology transfer and compensation
trade agreementwith ShanghaiFarEastAerotechnologyImportand Export
Corporation (SFAIC) under the Chinese Ministry of Aviation. The project
contract stipulated thatRevpowerwouldprovideequipment andtechnology
to SFAIC for use in the production of industrial battet'ieswhich wouldbe
sold at prices specified in the contract. Shortly after the contract was
concluded, SFAIC requested an increase in the sale price of the batteries
and assertedthat the Bank of Chinawould beunableto providea perform-
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Revpower gave notice of material breach, but continued with friendly
negotiations for anadditional 18months. Finally,Revpowerfiled for arbitra-
tion in Stockholm in accordance with the project contract. SFAIC partici-
pated in the arbitration, selecting an arbitrator and filing a statement of
defense and counterclaim in which it was alleged that Revpower had
breached its obligations on such matters as the quality and performance
capability of the technology and equipment supplied under the project
agreement. In a parallel action, SFAIC filed a suit with the Intermediate
Level People's Court in Shanghai claiming Revpower's breach of contract,
a move that appeared to violate the terms of the arbitration agreement in
the project agreement. SFAIC later withdrew from the Stockholm arbitral
proceedings, butthe panelunanimouslyconcludedthat therewas sufficient
evidence to proceed with a decision and granted Revpower an arbitral
award in the amount of U.S. $6,6 million plus interest.
Revpower's efforts toenforce the arbitralawardwere to noavail,as the
Shanghai Intermediate People'sCourt refusedeven to accept Revpower's
pleading for payment of fees. This is not the only instance where Chinese
courts refusedenforcement of foreign arbitralawards,26but it certainly has
becomesomethingofa causecel_bre because itappearsto involvea direct
violation ofChina's commitmenttoabide bythe terms ofthe 1958New York
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
As of February 1996,the award remains unrecognized and unenforced.
The Revpowercase reflectsa number of interestingtwists on the role
of culture in setting the context of dispute resolution. Onthe one hand, the
Chinese party's request to renegotiate the licensing/compensation trade
agreement shortly after it had been concluded reflected common Chinese
practices. Some argued that Chinese companies made concessions in
written agreements in orderto permitthe foreign negotiatorto gain facewith
her head office superiors, expecting that the relationship between the
parties could beadjusted asnecessary based onthe personal relationship
between the parties. Othersclaim that this type of conductwas motivated
purely by the striving for commercial advantage. As a result,the SFAIC's
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performance guarantees, once promised, would not be forthcoming are
subjectto varyinginterpretation.Theprocessofextendednegotiations over
these issues reflectedthe Chinese practiceof seeking amicable resolution
of differences, and incleedSFAIC may well be adopting a common view
among Chinese negotiatorsthat differences in opinion are not necessarily
"disputes" as such, and are thus more appropriately resolved through
friendly consultation. Revpowerclearly believed that a dispute had in fact
arisen and that a friendly consultation was merely one step toward a
concrete resolution. Thus, in the initial stages, the cultural predispositions
ofthe partiesappearto haveaffectednot onlytheemergenceofthe dispute,
but the differing perceptions of the nature of the dispute as well.
Once Revpowerfiled for arbitration, however, SFAICrevealed a clear
willingness to rely on the same kinds of formal legal mechanisms that
Revpowerwas using, eventhough thesewere foreign and unfamiliar.From
the filing of the counterclaim in Stockholm to the filing for adjudication in
Shanghai, SFAIC's actions to resist Revpower's claims suggest an ability
to adapt to the formalized dispute resolutionprocesses familiarto Western
litigators.
Revpower's efforts to secure enforcement of its Stockholm arbitral
award haveincludednot only legalprocedure,but alsopoliticalintercession
with Chinese government departments, and indirect political pressure
through the good offices of U.S. government departments.The responses
of the Chinese party and the Chinese government have been significantly
at variance. While SFAIChasshown its capacityto adoptto the institutions
and processes of formal dispute resolution, the Chinese government has
respondedwith general silenceand inaction.This is subjectto a number of
complementary interpretations. Of course there are many who would
suggestthat the Chinesegovernment ismotivated bythe economic advan-
tage of permitting SFAIC to continue resisting the enforcement of a U.S.
$6.6 million (U.S. $8 million with interest) award. Others suggest that the
Chinese central government's unwillingness to take action against either
SFAICand the ShanghaiIntermediate People'sCourt, or more importantly,
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the loyalty of Chinese leaders to their subordinates is the basis for the
cultural trait ofclientelism that hasbeen seento dominate Chinese politics.
Anadditional interpretationisthat the Chinesegovernment departments --
primarily the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade
and Economic Cooperation m which were approached initially, have little
influence since they are in other organizational systems (xitong) different
from those of either SFAIC or the Shanghai Intermediate People's Court.
Thus, the Chinese government's apparent inaction may be explained by
relevant Chinese organizational structures and behavior, as well as the
political culturewhich makesorganizational and personal contact the sine
qua non for political action.27Cultural influences appear to play a role in
these explanations, each of which may offer a partial explanation of the
Revpower dilemma.
In contrast, Revpower's and the U.S. government'sviews have tended
to bethat Chinahasacceded to the New Yorkconventionand, hence, must
ensure recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards regardless
of politicalcosts due tocultural norms.The Revpowercasemay well reveal
the inevitability ofconflictbetween privateactorsand states,whereone side
views legal obligations as subject to cultural norms and the other is driven
by the view that legalobligations transcend cultural imperatives.
Private-to-Private Disputes
Reportson private-to-private disputes involving Chinese and foreign
partiesare availablefrom a numberof publishedsources. 28While these
case reportsareoftenincomplete, theynonetheless provideusefulinsights
intothe culturalaspectsof disputeresolution, between privateparties.
Culturalaspectsof foreign businessdisputeswith Chinese partiesoften
begin early on in the commercialrelationship,as foreign and Chinese
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combines Leninismwith traditional Chinese patrimonial authoritarianism31
and does not accept basic preceptsof accountability uponwhich norms of
transparencyare based.Stratificationofcultureoftenplaysarole inconflicts
within Chineseand foreign enterprises and between principalsand agents,
particularlywhen agents motivated by personal relations and the prospect
of personal gain make representations to potential business partners that
are laterrepudiated bythe principals.32An analogoussituationariseswhen
Chinese and foreign parties enter intocontracts and beginto follow terms
that are never formally approved by Chinese government authorities as
required under China's "Foreign Economic Contract Law.''33 That such
decisions are deemed "correct" under Chinese law suggests significant
cultural and political differences over the authority of individual economic
actors to conclude businesstransactions independently.34
In a number of those cases, the contractual agreement between the
parties operated within a context of continually changing demands. Inone
case involving the shipment of galvanized plates, for example, the parties
agreedto change the nameof the recipientafter conclusionof the contract
but beforethe actual delivery.35Problems_rise when requests for change
occur later in the transactions, such as when changes are sought in the
quality and quantity of goods ordered well after the contract has been
concluded.36In a similar case, a seller Ofaluminum ingots requested a
change in the price and delivery terms well after the letterof credit paying
forthe goodshadalready beenopened.37While Chineserequeststomodify
agreedcontractterms have beenviewedbyforeign businessesasevidence
of lack of good faith,38 in many instances, these requests reflect an
expectation that the parties to the transaction would help one another in
responding to volatile (and to the Chinese possibly unknowable changes
in)marketconditions. Requestsforchanges incontractterms donotalways
signify expectations of a close relationship; however, as in the case of a
leather production investment project, changed contract terms were the
basis for a claim (later accepted by the arbitral tribunal) that the contract
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In several cases, fundamental differences in expectations were at the
root of the conflict. A typical concern, and one that arose in the context of
the Beijing Jeep dispute discussed above, has to do with the nature of
obligation between the parties.4° For example, a transaction involving
technology and equipmentsale,anda compensationtradeagreement gave
rise to a dispute over whether the equipment and technology met the
contract specifications.41The basic issue indispute seemed to bewhether
the obligation ofthe foreign partywas limited solely to the contract terms or
should be measured by the expectations of the Chinese party.Thus, while
the foreign seller/licensor made several attempts to correct perceived
inadequacies in the equipment and technology,the Chinese purchaser/li-
censee remained dissatisfiedF not becausethe terms ofthe contractwere
not fulfilled but because the Chinese were not able to reach what they
considered to be the ultimate goal of the projecLA similar problem arose
in the context of ajoint venture projectinvolving the production of emulsion
-- the Chinese partyclaimedthat the productionline installedby theforeign
investorwas not sufficiently modern, while the foreign investor arguedthat
it had met its contract obligations.42However,Chinese importers have not
always beenconcerned strictlywith projectobjectives. Inadispute overthe
performanceofglass blowing equipment,for instance,the Chinese insisted
on compensation for nonconforming goods even when it had been estab-
lished that the equipment met Chinese project requirements but fell short
of contract specifications.43
Assumptions that the Chinese contracting party's special relationship
with its counterpart transcend the contract terms are also evident in reac-
tions to the foreign party's view that the relationship is not particularly
special. For example, in a case involving the sale of bread preservatives,
the Chinese party agreed to revise the contract payment terms, then
renegedwhen they concludedthat the foreign seller merely soughtto avoid
customs duties.44The Chinese party's responseseemed motivated not by
the desire to enrich the Chinese Customs Service, but by disappointment
that the foreign partner would subordinate its relations with the Chinese
seller to concerns about avoiding import duties. A Chinese purchaser of168 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
packaging materials and equipment expressed similar disappointment in
resistingpayment ofa performancebonddemandedbythe foreign seller.45
Differing expectationsamong partiesalso arise when contracts do not
specifyterms concerning quality. In a matter involving the sale of transpar-
ent glass by a Chinese factory to a U.S. customer, the latter claimed that
the delivered productfailed tocomply with contractual requirementsfor the
sale of such glass. However, upon investigation and in light of Chinese
regulatory requirements, CIETAC concluded that the contract terms were
vague and that, in the absence of state and industry-wide standards, such
terms couldbedefined by referencetothe standardsofthe seller.The glass
in question was found to have complied with the seller's standards even
though aninternationalconsultingfirmconcludedthat it had"no commercial
value." Despitethe appearance ofa violation ofstandards of goodfaith, the
basis for the dispute revolved instead around substantive and formalistic
standards of quality. Incontrast tothe foreign purchaser's expectationthat
the term "transparent.glass" was self-evident, the Chinese seller (and the
Chinese arbitrators) concluded that issues of quality should be subject to
formal definitions even if these contradict appearances. Transparent glass
need not be transparent if so permitted by the producing firm's quality
standards.
The conduct of disputes can also be.subjectto cultural influences, as
Chinese norms of collective responsibility for management of conflict are
evident inexpectationsaboutmediationandconciliation.46Recent Chinese
government edicts prodding Chinese companies facing anti-dumping ac-
tions to litigate rather than negotiate a settlement suggest both the perva-
sive inflt_enceof the consensual resolution norm and the differences in
approach taken by Chinese companies and administrative agencies. In a
dispute between a Chinese and a Thai company,the issueconcerned with
the conformity of documents with the requirements of a letter of credit.47
The Chinese bank insisted on"strict compliance"while the Thai seller and
its negotiating bank claimed that the documentary differences were incon-
•sequential. In this case, both parties engaged in a lengthy process of
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under the auspices of CIETAC, After negotiations were without avail, the
Thai seller sought a political solution through the local bureauof the State
Administration for Industryand Commerce (SAIC) and appealed for acourt
judgment before pursuing a resolution through CIETAC.CIETAC oversaw
a mediatedsolutionwherein theThai sellerwas largelydeclaredwho!e.The
Thai company wrote a lengthy missive extolling the virtues of mediation.
In this case, there was no direct dispute between the .oartiesover the
performance of the terms of the contractual agreement. Rather, questions
centered around the conformity of documents to secure settlement of the
letter of credit. Normally, this should have been a matter for discussion
between the negotiating and confirming banks.48 In this case, however,
although the contracting partieswere unable to agree on the matter,they
revealed a willingness to participate in a managed resolution. It would
appearthat suchwillingness was helpedby the factthat the parties had no
substantial disagreement on the performance of the contract. Thus, the
willingnessto engagein voluntary disputesettlementin thiscase depended
not on the extent of economic interest, but rather on the fact that the
relationship was not undermined by either party's contract performance.
There are instances,however,when negotiated solutions do not solve
the dispute but only serve to sharpen the parties' differences. In a case
involving the sale of steel plates for use in a hydroelectric project, for
example, a disputeover analleged failureto deliver the goods ontime was
settled and the seller agreed to pay a negotiated sum. 49 The Chinese
importer,however,stillfiledforarbitration claimingadditionalcompensation.
Insome cases, difficulties in communication during the course of settling a
dispute exacerbated tensions between the parties, contributing toa break-
down in the transaction.5°
CULTURALASPECTS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
INVOLVINGCHINA: SUMMARY
A reviewof the various types of disputes involving foreignand Chinese
parties(government-to-government, private-to-government,andprivate-to-1"70 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
private) suggeststhat cultural factors can play a critical roleinthe emer-
gence, conductand resolutionof disputes. Disputesoften emerge as a
resultofdifferentexpectations of partiesregardingtheirrelationship toeach
otherand the natureof theirobligations.Often,theseareculturallydriven
with Chinesepartiesoftenexpectinga morefundamentalcommitment




alsoemergeas protractednegotiations oftenresultina solution, albeitnot
necessarily onewhichcan beexplainedpurelyby referencetotheoriginal




to purelyconsensual negotiationsand mediations.
As the case studiesdiscussedinthis paperindicate,cultureplaysa
potentially significantroleinthe emergence,conductandresolution oftrade
disputesinvolvinga vast array of governmentaland nongovernmental
entities.Fromquestions on thepossibilitythatnegotiations mayexacerbate
tensions due to cultural misunderstandingto the patternof consensual
disputeresolution thatmayservetostrengthenratherthandestroyrelation-
ships, and to whether disputes even exist, cultural issuesare present
everywhere and should be taken into account by negotiatorsfrom the
privateand publicsectors.It is importantto stress,however,that culture
does not explain everything.Indeed, many disputesarise out of pure
economicself-interest,andoftenthe participants indisputesare members
of elitewho sharemore inthe way of culturalnorms witheach other than
with members of the societiesthey purport to represent. Nonetheless,.
culturalfactorsshouldalways betaken intoaccount,astheycontributeto
boththe contextandthe contentof tradedisputes.POTTER: TRADE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA 171
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